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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
APACHE TANK LINES, INC.,
COWBOY OIL COMPANY,
ORVILLE R. STEVENS,
Administrator of 0. H. Guyman
Estate, CRYSTAL B. GUYMAN and PAUL W. COOK,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.

Case No.
10724

BEALL PIPE AND TANK
CORPORATION,
Defendant-Respondent.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellants brought suit against the respondent in the District Court of Carbon County,
State of Utah for damages to their property, and
respondent filed a ''motion to quash" service of
summons. Subsequently, on July 27, 1966, the Honorable Henry Ruggeri, Judge, granted the motion
from which order this appeal is taken.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On December 30, 1965, appellants' filed suit
against the respondent in the District Court of Car1

hon County. Respondent appeared specifically and
filed a motion entitled a "motion to quash" service
of summons. Memoranda were submitted by the
parties and on July 27, 1966, the Honorable Henry
Ruggeri, Judge, issued an order granting the respondent's "motion to quash."
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal of the trial court's
decision and a judgment determining that the District Court of Carbon County has full jurisdiction
over the appellants' claims against defendant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellants' submit the following statement
of facts which are generally uncontested.
The plaintiffs' filed an action in the District
Court of Carbon County alleging that plaintiff,
Apache Tank Lines, Inc., was the owner of a petroleum tractor-trailer which at the time of the cause
of action was leased to Cowboy Oil Co., (R-1). The
other plaintiff was the Estate of 0. H. Guyrnan.
It was alleged that on November 4, 1964, the tractor-trailer unit was destroyed in Price City, Carbon
County, Utah. It was also alleged that the tractortrailer unit had been purchased from the respon·
dent on April 24, 1964. It was further alleged that
negligence and breach of various sales warrantees
by the defendant rendered defendant liable to the
plaintiffs in the sum of $30,387.16 plus $11,761.61
special damages ( R-1, 2, 3) .
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Service of the summons and complaint was
made upon the Secretary of State of the State of
Utah (R-9). Subsequent thereto, the respondent
purported to appear specially and filed a motion
to quash on the grounds that it was not doing business in the State of Utah, and was not doing business in the State of Utah on April 24, 1964, nor
anytime since then ( R-10) . The motion further
assailed the service of process on the grounds that
it was not served upon any representative of the
company. An affidavit from the company's comptroller was filed accompanying the motion which
stated that the respondent had qualified to do business in Utah as a foreign corporation on May 3,
1961, but the Secretary of State had revoked the
company's certificate of authority on February 28,
1964, for failure to file an annual report for the
year 1962 (R-13, 56, 57). The affidavit further
noted that the respondent had maintained a salaried
employee in Utah from May 3, 1961, to around
October, 1963, but had had no employees residing
in the State of Utah since then. It also stated the
respondent had not had any office, licensed dealer,
franchise agent, commission agent, bank accounts,
or did any advertising in Utah since October, 1963
(R-14).
No showing was made by the respondent that
it ever filed any withdrawal from the State. On the
basis of the above facts the trial judge granted its
3

the order quashing the service, apparently on the
grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the defendant.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
RESPONDENTS' MOTION SINCE:
A. THE COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE
RESPONDENT, AND
B. SERVICE WAS PROPERLY MADE ON THE
SECRETARY OF STATE.

Appellant submits the trial court had jurisdiction over the respondent corporation. It is, of course,
acknowledged that at the time of the alleged damage
to appellants that respondent had no agent in Utah
and was not engaging in solicitation of business.
However, it is submitted that the respondent company was subject to the jurisdiction of the Utah
Courts because it had qualified to do business in the
State of Utah, and although its Certificate of Authority to do business as a foreign corporation had
been revoked it was still present within the State
of Utah until a withdrawal in accord with Utah
law had been accomplished.
It is assumed that the respondent's motion
to quash was in fact a motion to dismiss under Rule
12-B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, since
there is no such thing as a "motion to quash" under
the present Rules of Civil Procedure in Utah.
It is admitted in the affidavit of the respondent
that it had a Certificate of Authority to do business
4

in the State of Utah and was a duly qualified for-

ejgn corporation at one time. The only question is,
does the revocation of the Certificate of Authority
by the Secretary of State in such a fashion as to
prevent service of process upon or jurisdiction over
a corporation that has had its Certificate of Authority revoked. 16-10-103 U.C.A., 1953, provided that
a foreign corporation shall have the same powers
and rights as a domestic corporation during the time
that it is operating in the State of Utah.

16-10-108 U.C.A., 1953, merely provides that
upon issuance of a Certificate of Authority by the
Secretary of State the foreign corporation shall be
authol'ized to transact business in the State of Utah.
16-10-109 U.C.A., 1953, requires the appointment
of a registered agent for a foreign corporation upon
whom service of process may be served.
16-10-111 U.C.A., 1953, provides in part:
Whenever a foreign corporation authorized
to transact business in this state shall fail to
appoint or maintain a registered agent in this
state, or whenever any such registered agent
cannot with reasonable diligence be found at
the registered office, or whenever the Certificate of Authority of a foreign corporation
shall be suspended or revoked, then the Secretary of State shall be an agent of such c?rporation upon whom any such process, notice
or demand may be served.
Thus, if a foreign corporation's Certificate of
Authority has been revoked, service of process on
5

the Secretary of State of the State of Utah is suffi.
cient service to invoke jurisdiction if the other elements of jurisdiction are present. See Town of
Hinkley v. Kettle River Railroad Co., 70 Minn. 105,
72 N.W. 835; Section 13, Model Business Corporation Act Annotated.
In Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Willimn L. Pereira & Associates, 16 Utah
2d 365, 401 P.2d 439 ( 1965), this court ruled that
where a foreign corporation otherwise subject to the
jurisdiction of the State of Utah had failed to appoint a registered agent to receive service of process, that service could be effected upon the Secretary of State of the State of Utah.
It is, therefore, apparent that the respondents'
motion to the extent it sought to "quash" the service of process based upon a contention that the Secretary of State of the State of Utah would not be
a proper person upon whom to make service is not
well taken if the jurisdictional prerequisites are
present to otherwise confer jurisdiction on the court.
At the time service of process was effected in the
Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Association case
cited above, the respondent had moved itself from
the jurisdiction and there was no registered process agent in the state. Therefore, if this court has
jurisdiction over the respondent, the service of process being made upon the Secretary of State is adequate to give jurisdiction over the respondent corporation.
6

The present law relating to jurisdiction over
foreign corporations is not one based upon a mechanical test of its presence. Rather, in the case of
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
the United States Supreme Court said that jurisdiction could be based upon "fair play and substantial justice." Ehrenzweig & Louisell, Jurisdiction In
A Nntshell, State and Federal, Section 5, p. 26,
1964. The present test seems to be one of "minimum
contacts" with the state of the forum. If there are
such minimum contacts with the state, it is immaterial whether the cause of action arises from business within the state, the court of the state wherein
the minimum contacts exist has jurisdiction. Perkins
v. Benquet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437
(1952); McGee v. International Life Insurance Company, 355 U.S. 220 ( 1957). It is submitted that the
Utah statutes recognize that a foreign corporation
that obtains a Certificate of Authority, even though
that Certificate of Authority is revoked by the Secretary of State, still has substantial minimum contacts with the state to warrant its being sued in
the State of Utah until the corporation actually
withdraws.
16-10-115 U.C.A., 1953, provides for the withdrawal of a foreign corporation. In order for a
foreign corporation to withdraw from the State of
Utah, the corporation must deliver to the Secretary
of State an application for withdrawal containing
various information. Thereafter, withdrawal may
7

be had upon approval by the Secretary of State after
the foreign corporation meeting various criteria.
Thereafter, the corporation is still subject to suit on
various transactions that might have arisen during the time of its incorporation. On the other hand
'
the Secretary of State is authorized to revoke the
Certificate of Authority of a foreign corporation if
that corporation fails to abide by and comply with
the laws of the State of Utah. 16-10-117 U.C.A.,
1953. Subsection (a) of that section provides a
basis for revocation when "the corporation has failed to file its annual report within the time required
by this act and has failed to pay any fees or penalties prescribed by this act when they have
become due and payable." The issuance of a
Certificate of Revocation by the Secretary of
State results in the suspension of the authority of
the corporation to transact business in the state.
16-10-118 U.C.A., 1953. To say that revocation completely ousted the corporation from the State of
Utah and reduced all minimal contacts so that state
courts could have no jurisdiction would give a foreign corporation a benefit that it otherwise would
not receive if it went through the normal withdrawal
process. It is submitted that revocation does nothing
more than prevent the foreign corporation from doing business in the State of Utah but that the corporation is still present within the state so far as the
8

jurisdiction of citizens within the state to process
claims against the foreign corporation.
This conclusion is supported by the provisions
of 16-10-111 U.C.A., 1953, which provides that when
a foreign corporation has had its Certificate of
Authority revoked that service of process may be
made upon the Secretary of State. Thus the Legislature has apparently recognized that the corporation still exists for the purpose of being subjected
to the jurisdiction of the State of Utah. Supporting
his conclusion is the decision of Priidential Federal
Savings & Loan Association v. Hartford Accident
& Indemnity Co., 7 Utah 2d 366, 325 P.2d 899
( 1958) . In that case, the issue before this court was
whether a foreign corporation which has qualified
to do business in the State of Utah but has had its
charter forfeited because of failure to pay taxes
could maintain a cause of action in the State of
Utah. The applicable statutory provision was one
comparable to 16-10-117 U.C.A., 1953, and was
Section 16-9-3 U.C.A., 1953, under the previous
Corporation Act. Speaking on the applicable provision, the Court stated:
It has no application where the foreign corporation has in fact qualified to do business in
the state (as Felt did here) and the corporate
charter has been subjected to forfeiture for
failure to pay taxes.
It is submitted that by analogy, the same rule
should be applicable to the provisions relating to
9

the revocation of a Certificate of Authority for
failure to file an annual report. A foreign corporation desiring to avoid the jurisdiction of the State
of Utah without going through the withdrawal
proceedings could very simply fail to file its annual
report and then contend that state courts had no
jurisdiction over it simply because its business activities had ceased in the state. It is submitted that
orderly public administration of foreign corporations requires that they remain subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of the State of Utah until they
have properly withdrawn in accordance with the
laws of the State of Utah. This being so, the mere
revocation of the Certificate of Authority does not
result in a complete ouster of the corporation from
the state and there is still sufficient minimal contacts sufficient to allow the corporation to be sued
in the State of Utah by citizens, or others in the
State of Utah, who have claims against the foreign
corporation. Especially should this be so where the
claim arises in the State of Utah as is the instant
case. Limitation on the revocation of a Certificate
of Authority should be a limitation against the corporation doing business during the time that it fails
to comply with the laws of the State of Utah and
not a prohibition against a citizen suing the corporation. To construe the law to the contrary would in
effect grant a foreign corporation a cloak of im·
munity which it would not otherwise have.
Support for this contention is noted in 25
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Corporation Journal, Rights After Withdrawal, 3
p. 6 ( 1966), where it is noted:
When the loss of the corporation's right to
do business is due to revocation rather than
withdrawal, there is even less doubt as to the
corporation's amenability to suit . To allow
a corporation, by its wilful acts, to forfeit
the right to do business in a state and thereby
evade the jurisdiction of its courts would
clearly be inequitable.
A similar realization is the basis of the decision
in Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Association
v. William L. Pereira & Associates, supra.
The Certificate of Authority of the respondent
was never withdrawn, as distinct from revoked.
The question of authority to continue to transact
business by a foreign corporation is an entirely different principle than the question of whether a
company that has not withdrawn is still within the
state for the purposes of jurisdiction. 16-10-111,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, obviously was intended
to maintain the local jurisdiction until the criteria
of withdrawal are met.
A recent Arizona case, Robinson Brick & Tile
Co. v. Copperstate Supply Co., Inc., 100 Ariz. 28,
410 P.2d 96 (1966), is definitely in point. Plaintiff
was a Colorado corporation. It made application
for withdrawal from Arizona which application was
not aproved for several months during which time
plaintiff contracted with defendant. The trial court
ruled plaintiff could not maintain the action bell

cause the contract was made subsequent to filing
for withdrawal. On appeal the defendants alleged
that plaintiff automatically revoked its license to do
business upon filing and hence was not doing business in Arizona and could not sue on the contract.
The Arizona Supreme Court rejected the contention
holding the company was still present until withdrawal was completed.
The same ruling should be applicable here. The
respondent was still present in Utah, only its authority to do business was revoked. Withdrawal requires compliance with several other requirements,
16-1-115, 116, U.C.A., 1953. Orderly administration requires the presence of the corporation until
the requirements of withdrawal are met. If they are
not met, including the tax responsibility, as was the
case here, the corporation should be deemed present
and service allowed under 16-10-111, U.C.A., 1953.
It is submitted, therefore, the trial court's decision
should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
The respondent failed to follow proper proce·
dure to withdraw from doing business in Utah. Re·
vocation of its authority was not withdrawal. It
did not terminate the corporate presence and "minimum contacts" but merely the right to operate.
Sound public policy warrants requiring a corpor·
ation to be deemed present until the essential re·
quirements of withdrawal are met. Since this was
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not done in this case, respondent was and is still
present in Utah and subject to jurisdiction and
service upon the Secretary of State. This court
should reverse.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON & BALDWIN
REX J. HANSON
Attornys for Appellants
909 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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